Regulatory Competition and the Increasing Fragility of CCPs

Project Start:02/2017
Status:Completed
Researchers:Jan Friedrich, Christian Hirsch, Andreas Nölke, Matthias Thiemann
Category: Financial Intermediation
Funded by:LOEWE

This project’s goal was to understand the regulatory dynamics within the EU regarding the regulation of central counterparties (CCPs). A European supervision was deemed desirable to avoid regulatory competition and the increasing fragility of CCPs due to the effect of “predatory margining” (Krahnen and Pelizzon 2016).Which effects hindered the Europeanization of the supervision of CCPs in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008 and Brexit?

We observed the element of “regulatory cascading”, a multiplicity of different regulatory initiatives, which would have to be resolved for European Supervision to become a reality.

Related Published Papers

Author/sTitleYearProgram AreaKeywords
Jan Friedrich, Matthias ThiemannMuch Ado about Nothing? Macro-Prudential Ideas and the Post-Crisis Regulation of Shadow Banking
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie
2018 Financial Intermediation financial regulation, shadow banking, epistemic authority, private risk-management
Jan Friedrich, Matthias ThiemannCapital Markets Union: The Need for Common Laws and Common Supervision
DIW-Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
2017 Financial Intermediation Capital Markets Union, clearing, regulatory competition, regulatory arbitrage, supervision

Related Policy Publications

AuthorTitlePublished
Jan Friedrich,
Matthias Thiemann
A New Governance Architecture for European Financial Markets? Towards a European Supervision of CCPs
White Paper No. 53
2018
Jan Friedrich,
Christian Resch,
Matthias Thiemann
If you do it, do it right – The need for a Common European Supervisory Architecture for CCPs
Policy Letter No. 70
2018
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