|Researchers:||Jan Friedrich, Christian Hirsch, Andreas Nölke, Matthias Thiemann|
This project’s goal was to understand the regulatory dynamics within the EU regarding the regulation of central counterparties (CCPs). A European supervision was deemed desirable to avoid regulatory competition and the increasing fragility of CCPs due to the effect of “predatory margining” (Krahnen and Pelizzon 2016).Which effects hindered the Europeanization of the supervision of CCPs in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008 and Brexit?
We observed the element of “regulatory cascading”, a multiplicity of different regulatory initiatives, which would have to be resolved for European Supervision to become a reality.
|Jan Friedrich, Matthias Thiemann||Much Ado about Nothing? Macro-Prudential Ideas and the Post-Crisis Regulation of Shadow Banking|
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie
|2018||Financial Intermediation||financial regulation, shadow banking, epistemic authority, private risk-management|
|Jan Friedrich, Matthias Thiemann||Capital Markets Union: The Need for Common Laws and Common Supervision|
DIW-Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung
|2017||Financial Intermediation||Capital Markets Union, clearing, regulatory competition, regulatory arbitrage, supervision|
|A New Governance Architecture for European Financial Markets? Towards a European Supervision of CCPs|
White Paper No. 53
|If you do it, do it right – The need for a Common European Supervisory Architecture for CCPs|
Policy Letter No. 70