|Researchers:||Nikolaus Fink, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Konrad Stahl, Christine Zulehner|
|Category:||Law and Finance|
Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country's EU Accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered cartels to learn about the inner workings of cartels. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (1964). Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialization cartels divide markets, and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylized facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustain collusion.
|Nikolaus Fink, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Konrad Stahl, Christine Zulehner||Registered Cartels in Austria: An Overview|
European Journal of Law and Economics
|2017||Law and Finance||Collusion, Cartels, Legal cartels, Contracts|