|Category:||Law and Finance, Transparency Lab|
Excessive remuneration has raised legislators’ awareness and has become the subject of intense academic debate. The project, combining empirical and legal analysis, seeks to enhance our understanding of the link between potential conflicts of interest (shareholders vs. managers and shareholders vs. tax payers) and to provide the basis for an improved corporate governance of financial institutions. In particular, the say-on-pay provisions may endorse aforementioned conflicts.
The project researchers will utilize a unique set of data that had been collected in order to produce two papers. The first paper is a descriptive paper including economic analysis of the data, reviewing the effectiveness of the legal provisions governing say-on-pay in Germany. A first version of “Does Say on Pay Matter? Evidence from the German Natural Experiment” by Tobias Tröger and Uwe Walz is completed and will be submitted to a journal soon.
The second paper involves a comparative legal analysis on say-on-pay provisions in Germany and in other jurisdictions. The latter have been selected with regard to the close relation to the German discussion (e.g. EU and the Commission Proposal for a revised Shareholder Rights Directive), the innovativeness or distinctness of the respective rules (e.g. two-strikes regime in Australia, newly established binding vote in Switzerland), and their accessibility, which may be missing because of language problems (e.g. Middle East and Japan). The ultimate purpose is to investigate the extent to which ownership in companies could be a substitute for financial regulation. Furthermore, a workshop has been organized for the purpose of promoting the planned working papers. At the same time, such opportunity is expected to provide relevant feedback for the research project.
|Tobias Tröger, Uwe Walz||Does Say on Pay Matter? Evidence from Germany|
European Company and Financial Law Review
|2019||Law and Finance, Transparency Lab||Say-on-pay, corporate governance, management compensation|
|Brigitte Haar||"Comply or Explain" im Spannungsfeld von Law and Finance|
100 Jahre Rechtswissenschaft in Frankfurt (Vittorio Klostermann)
|2014||Law and Finance, Transparency Lab|
|125||Tobias Tröger, Uwe Walz||Does Say on Pay Matter? Evidence from Germany||2016||Law and Finance, Transparency Lab||Say-on-pay, corporate governance, management compensation|
|154||Brigitte Haar||Shareholder Wealth vs. Stakeholder interests? Evidence from Code Compliance under the German Corporate Governance Code||2016||Law and Finance, Transparency Lab||corporate governance codes, soft law, stakeholder, shareholder wealth, market enforcement, German corporate governance, supervisory board, incentive pay, severance pay caps, age limits|
|57||Financial Regulation in the EU – Cross-Border Capital Flows, Systemic Risk and the European Banking Union as Reference Points for EU Financial Market Integration||2014||Law and Finance, Transparency Lab||Financial regulation, systemic risk, microprudential supervision, European Banking Authority, macroprudential supervision, European Systemic Risk Board, European Banking Union, Single Supervisory Mechanism|