Conference on Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions
Jointly organized by SAFE Frankfurt and the University of Oxford with the financial support by the European Corporate Governance Research Foundation.
The quality of corporate governance, i.e. the effectiveness of institutions that contain agency costs, is a key component of asset allocation. In countries characterized by concentrated ownership, minority shareholder expropriation, also known as tunneling, is the main concern from the perspective of outside investors. Tunneling can be the outcome of a number of expropriation techniques. A common way to extract value from the controlled corporation is for the dominant shareholder to engage in transactions with it at favourable terms (so-called related party transactions).
We bring together top scholars in law and finance to reflect upon the role of dominant shareholders in listed firms, tunneling-control as a key component to enhance capital market development, and the content and effectiveness of the reform efforts undertaken in various jurisdictions.
This event is by invitation only!